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Tax-Exempt Private Schools Which Discriminate on the
Basis of Race: A Proposed Revenue Procedure
David L. Anderson*
I. A Comparison of the Original and Revised
Proposed Revenue Procedures
On August 22, 1978, the Internal Revenue Service proposed revenue pro-
cedures which would revoke the section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status of private
schools which discriminate on the basis of race. The original rules proposed
divided private schools into three classes: "adjudicated schools," "reviewable
schools," and "other."' A "school adjudicated to be discriminatory" meant
any private school found to be discriminatory in a final court or administrative
agency decision. 2 A "reviewable school" was a private school which had never
been adjudicated discriminatory but which was formed or substantially ex-
panded at about the same time as public school desegregation in the communi-
ty served by the school. 3 Such expansion was said to justify an inference of
discrimination if the school did not have a minimum percentage of minority
students, i.e., twenty percent of the minority school-age children in the com-
munity served by the school. "Other school" meant a school "neither ad-
judicated to be discriminatory" nor "reviewable." 4
For the original and reviewable schools, objective standards were set forth
which the schools had to meet to rebut the adjudication or inference of
discrimination. 5 However, these standards could be expanded to the "other
schools" category where minority enrollment was insubstantial and where the
school failed to show this enrollment level was unrelated to discrimination. 6
The basic standards to rebut the adjudication or inference were: (1) a
minimum number of minority students, i.e., twenty percent of the percentage
of minority school-age children in the community, or (2) the presence of four
out of five indices of good faith operation, i.e., significant financial aid to
minority students, vigorous minority recruitment programs, an increasing
percentage of minority students, employment of minority teachers, and "other
substantial evidence of good faith." 7 However, even if four out of the five in-
dices were met, the inference of discrimination would generally not be rebutted
if the school did not enroll any minority students. 8
If the private school failed to rebut an adjudication or inference of
discrimination, the Service would revoke its tax exemption and suspend ad-
* B.A., Wheaton College, 1975; J.D., George Washington University, 1979. Member of the Ohio
Bar.
1 43 Fed. Reg. 37,296 (1978).
2 Id. at 37,297 (proposed § 3.02).
3 Id. (proposed § 3.03).
4 Id. (proposed 5 3.04).
5 Id. at 37,298 (proposed § 4.02).
6 Id. (proposed § 5.04).
7 Id. (proposed 5 4).
8 Id. (proposed § 4.02.2).
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vance assurance of the deductibility of contributions. The school could prevent
this prompt revocation, but not the suspension of advanced assurance, by re-
questing a grace period and agreeing to meet the standard within a reasonable
period, i.e., two school years or less. If the school failed to meet the standards
during the grace period, its tax-exempt status would retroactively be revoked
and all contributions made since the suspension of advance assurance would be
denied deductibility. 9
Following the publication of the proposed revenue procedure on August
22, 1978, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) received over 100,000 letters of
public comment. As a result of the consideration of these comments, the IRS
issued a revised version of the proposed guidelines, in which it limited itself to
more narrowly defined "adjudicated" and "reviewable" schools. In addition,
it substantially increased its discretion in the determination whether a private
school has rebutted an inference or adjudication of racial discrimination. 0
The definition of reviewable schools is substantially narrowed by the addi-
tion of a third factor. To be a reviewable school, a school must not only (1) be
formed or substantially expanded at the time of public school desegregation in
the community and (2) not have less than a significant minority student enroll-
ment, but also (3) be a school where formation or substantial expansion is
"related in fact to the public school desegregation in the community."" Subse-
quently, the revised version sets out seven examples of specific facts which
would tend to indicate the lack of a relationship in fact to school desegregation
and seven examples of facts which would support a relationship.' 2
The definition of "reviewable schools" is further narrowed by providing
that a one-year increase in students of twenty percent or less (as compared with
ten percent previously) will not be considered substantial expansion 13 and by
providing that the determination of whether a school's minority enrollment is
insignificant will be based on all relevant facts and circumstances, with con-
sideration given to special factors which limit the school's ability to attract
minority students. 14 An example of such a factor would be an emphasis, for
nondiscriminatory purposes, on specific programs or curricula which interest
only groups not composed of significant numbers of minority students, i.e.,
Hebrew or Amish schools.15
In addition, the revised procedure provides that where schools are part of
a large system of commonly supervised schools, and some of the schools do not
meet the enrollment criteria, these may still be considered to have significant
minority enrollment if the minority enrollment throughout the system satisfies
the proposed numerical standard.' 6 This would remove the Catholic school
system from the reviewable category.
Although the period for determining which formation or substantial ex-
pansions are suspect r6main the same, i.e., one year before and three years
9 Id. (proposed S 5).
10 44 Fed. Reg. 9,451 (1979).
11 Id. at 9,452 (proposed 5 3.03).
12 Id. at 9,453 (proposed 5 3.03(c)).
13 Id. (proposed 5 3.03(a)).
14 Id. (proposed S 3.03(b)).
15 Id. (proposed S 3.03(c)(6)).
16 Id. (proposed S 3.03(b)(1,2,3)).
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after desegregation,1 7 the revised version considers the time of desegregation to
be when substantial implementation of the relevant desegregation order took
place.18 This limits the duration of the suspect desegregation period as com-
pared to the original version where the period was to continue until three years
after final implementation of the desegregation plan. 19
An additional technical change occurred in the definition of the "com-
munity" served by the private school. The community remains the public
school district in which the school is located, 20 but includes additional districts
only if the school enrolls at least twenty percent2 1 (as compared to five percent)
of its students from them.
Under both proposed revenue procedures, if a school is classified as "ad-
judicated" or "reviewable," the burden of proof shifts, and it is called upon to
show it has taken actions or programs reasonably designed to attract minority
students on a continuing basis. 22 Instead of requiring a definite standard of
four out of five indices of good faith, 23 six examples of actions which may con-
tribute to attracting minority students are listed and the level of action required
can vary with the circumstances of the school depending upon its minority
enrollment. 24 Thus, under the revised procedure, the standards are much more
flexible for rebutting an adjudication or inference of discrimination.
The revised procedure removes the "grace period" of the August 22 pro-
cedure; 2 in its place it provides in appropriate cases for deferral of final revoca-
tion of exemption if the school is pursuing in good faith the type of program re-
quired to rebut an inference of discrimination. For those schools which are
granted deferral, not only will revocation of exemption be delayed, but ad-
vance assurance of the deductibility of contributions will also remain in force
subject to the provisions of Revenue Procedure 72-39.26 All schools for whom
revocations are proposed may appeal the determination administratively to the
IRS national office or may go to court under a section 501(c)(3) declaratory
judgment proceeding. 27
Finally, a two-tiered effective date exists for the proposed procedure. The
effective date for adjudicated schools and for schools applying for exemption
after final publication of the procedure would be the date of final publication.
The date for reviewable schools would be January 1, 1980.
17 43 Fed. Reg. 37,296, 37,297 (1978) (proposed § 3.03).
18 44 Fed. Reg. 9,451, 9,453 (1979) (proposed § 3.03(a)).
19 43 Fed. Reg. 37,296, 37,297 (1978) (proposed § 3.03).
20 44 Fed. Reg. 9,451, 9,453 (1979) (proposed § 3.04).
21 Id. (proposed 5 3.04).
22 43 Fed. Reg. 37,296, 37,297-98 (1978) (proposed § 3.03).
23 Id. at 37,298 (proposed § 4.03).
24 44 Fed. Reg. 9,451, 9,454 (1979) (proposed § 4.03).
25 43 Fed. Reg. 37,296, 37,297 (1978) (proposed § 3.03).
26 Rev. Proc. 72-39, 1972-2 C.B. 818. Sections 3.01 and 4.05 of this revenue procedure deny deduc-
tions for contributions to parties who are responsible for a policy that supports a revocation or have
knowledge that a revocation is imminent. Further, it gives IRS district directors, subject to administrative
appeal rights, the discretion to deny continued advance assurance of the deductibility of contributions when
they have information that clearly raises serious doubt concerning the continued qualification of the
organization to receive deductible contributions.
27 44 Fed. Reg. 9,451, 9,454-55 (1979) (proposed § 7).
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II. The Legal Basis of IRS Authority to Deny Tax Exemption
to Private Schools Which Discriminate
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code exempts organizations
"organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, . . . or educa-
tional purposes." However, an educational organization is not exempt if it
operates illegally or contrary to public policy. Racial discrimination in educa-
tion is contrary to well-established public policy. Thus, the Internal Revenue
Service asserts that it has an obligation to deny tax exemption to private schools
which are racially discriminatory. 28
For more than fifty years after the establishment of the Internal Revenue
Service, a favorable tax status was allowed to institutions without regard to a
school's particular social or philosophical position. As a result of the constitu-
tional doctrine of separate but equal educational facilities, denial of tax benefits
was never considered either judicially or administratively.
However, the separate but equal doctrine was overturned in 1954 in
Brown v. Board of Education29 and racial discrimination in public education was
ruled illegal and contrary to public policy.
In 1965, the IRS suspended rulings to private schools while considering
the question of the effect of racial discrimination on their tax-exempt status. In
1967, it announced its position that racially discriminatory private schools
which received state aid were not entitled to tax-exempt status.3 0 Thus, prior to
1970, the Internal Revenue Service recognized, as tax exempt, racially
discriminatory private schools which were not receiving state aid.
The IRS policy of nonintervention was first challenged in 1970 in Green v.
Kennedy. 31 In this suit, black taxpayers in Mississippi and their minor children
alleged that exempt status was unconstitutional to the extent it supported the
establishment and maintenance of segregated private schools through tax
benefits and deductions. Further, they asserted the benefits violated Title VI of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act 32 because they provided federal financial assistance
to organizations which were racially discriminatory. In its decision, the district
court found that a substantial constitutional right was involved and that grant-
ing tax-exempt status to an organization which discriminated against
minorities frustrated the constitutional mandate of a unitary school system by
providing government support for endeavors to continue under* private
auspices a racially segregated dual school system. 33
In response, the IRS issued two press releases stating it would no longer
grant tax-exempt status to schools which maintained racially discriminatory
admissions policies.3 4 The IRS reasoned that all organizations under section
501 and all contributions pursuant to section 170 must initially qualify as
28 Proposed IRS Revenue Procedure Affecting Tax-Exemption of Private Schools: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways andMeans, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1979) (statement ofJerome Kurtz).
29 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
30 IRS News Release (August 2, 1967).
31 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C. 1970), appeal dismissed sub nom. Cannon v. Green, 399 U.S. 956 (1970),
appeal dismissed sub noam. Colt v. Green, 400 U.S. 986 (1971).
32 42 U.S.C. 5 2000d (1976).
33 309 F. Supp. at 1137.
34 IRS News Release (July 19, 1970); IRS News Release (July 10, 1970).
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"charitable" under the common law. Since racial discrimination conflicts with
federal policy and all charities must be in accord with federal public policy,
private segregated schools do not qualify as a charity within the meaning of sec-
tion 501.
Following the issuance of the IRS ruling, the district court for the District
of Columbia convened a three-judge panel to make permanent the temporary
injunction issued in Green v. Kennedy. In its deliberation, entitled Green v. Con-
nally,35 the court set forth a declaratory decree. It reasoned that the changed
position of the Service would not provide sufficient relief for the plaintiffs
because the interpretation of the Code could change in the future. Relying on
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the decisions of the Supreme Court banning racial
segregation in public schools, and the post-Civil War amendments to the Con-
stitution, the Green court found that there was a federal policy against govern-
ment support for racial segregation of public or private schools. 36 Thus,
because the Internal Revenue Code, as well as federal public policy, was op-
posed to support for racial segregation of schools, the court ruled that the Code
did not provide tax exemption for private schools which had racially
discriminatory policies and permanently enjoined the service from approving
the exemption of any private school in Mississippi that failed to make a
specifically required showing in support of its exemption. At this time, the test
was publication in a reasonably effective manner of their racially non-
discriminatory policy.
The Green court avoided a direct ruling on the constitutional claim that the
due process clause of the fifth amendment prohibited the federal government
from providing financial support through tax benefits to institutions that
discriminate on the basis of race. The Internal Revenue Code does not con-
template the granting of special federal tax benefits to trusts or organizations,
whether or not entitled to the special state rules relating to charitable trusts,
whose organization or operation contravene federal public policy.3 7 The court
did note, however, that all charitable trusts, educational or otherwise, must be
legal and in compliance with public policy.38
Two points in the court's order are important for a consideration of the
proposed rule since it calls for specific IRS enforcement. First, the Green court
required publication of a school's nondiscrimination policy in an effective
means to bring it to the attention of minorities. 39 Second, the Green court ruled
that the IRS must receive background information from a school in order to be
in an effective position to determine if the school has actually established a non-
discrimination policy.40 Thus, it could be argued that before the proposed rule
the IRS was not living up to the enforcement standards which the court had set
forth.
In McGlotten v. Connally4 the District Court for the District of Columbia ap-
35 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'dper curiam sub noma. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
36 Id. at 1163.
37 Id. at 1162.
38 Id. at 1161.
39 Id. at 1179.
40 Id. at 1180.
41 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972).
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plied the nondiscrimination requirement beyond the educational context to
other nonprofit organizations entitled to tax benefits under the Code. The
court sustained the constitutional challenge to beneficial tax treatment for
racially exclusive fraternal orders and found that the government had become
sufficiently entwined with the private parties to ensure compliance with the
fifth amendment. 42 In its ruling, the court considered the public nature of the
activity, the degree of regulatory control in determining the organizations
which may qualify for beneficial tax treatment, and the aura of government ap-
proval in an IRS exemption ruling. Thus, McGlotten struck down the deduction
provisions for contributions both to nonprofit private clubs and to fraternal
organizations that discriminate on the basis of race.
As a result of Green and McGlotten, the IRS felt that it had a statutory and
constitutional basis to implement a nondiscrimination requirement. In 1971,
Revenue Ruling 71-47743 published and explained the nondiscrimination re-
quirement, stating that a private school with a racially discriminatory policy as
to students did not qualify for exemption. In 1972, Revenue Procedure 72-54 4
established guidelines for certain private schools claiming tax exemption to
publicize a racially nondiscriminatory policy. Examples of methods of publica-
tion were made, but no requirements of any particular method were set forth.
Revenue Procedure 75-5045 required all tax-exempt private schools to
adopt formally a nondiscrimination policy in their charter, bylaws, or govern-
ing instrument; to refer to the policy in all brochures and catalogs; and to
publish notice of the policy annually in a newspaper or by use of the broadcast
media. Schools were also required to maintain records showing factors relevant
to their racial composition.
Civil rights groups and the Civil Rights Division of the Department of
Justice questioned whether Revenue Procedure 75-50 enabled the Service to
determine whether a school had actually established a policy of nondiscrimina-
tion 46 as required by the Green court. Following Revenue Procedure 75-50, the
IRS has declared itself unable to revoke the exemptions of private schools
which have been specifically adjudicated by federal courts to be racially
discriminatory as long as the schools have published a pro forma statement of a
contrary policy.4 7
The most significant case holding a private school with tax-exempt status
to be racially discriminatory was Norwood v. Harrison.48 In determining the
eligibility of seven individual schools to receive aid under a state textbook pro-
gram to private schools, the court noted that it was well settled in racial
desegregation cases that the parties alleging discrimination need only make a
42 Id. at 456.
43 Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230.
44 Rev. Proc. 72-54, 1972-2 C.B. 834.
45 Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 587.
46 330 F. Supp. at 1180.
47 Since the publication of Rev. Proc. 75-50, the IRS has revoked the tax exemption of only one private
school. This school refused to adopt even a pro forma policy of nondiscrimination. During this time the Ser-
vice did not move against 20 schools which had been adjudicated discriminatory which did adopt pro forma
policies.
Statement by Stuart E. Siegel, IRS Chief Counsel, to Stonybrook, New York Tax Institute (Oct. 21,
1978).
48 382 F. Supp. 921 (D. Miss. 1974),'on remandfrom 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
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prima facie case of racial discrimination after which "the burden shifts to the
school's officials or representatives to rebut an inference of racial disparity."49
Again, citing Hodgson v. First Federal Savings and Loan Association:50
In discrimination cases the law with respect to burden of proof is well settled.
The plaintiff is required only to make out a prima facie case of unlawful
discrimination at which point the burden shifts to the defendants to justify the
existence of any disparities. 51
Norwood went further to define specific facts which would be sufficient to
constitute a prima facie case of racial discrimination:
(a) that the school's existence began close upon the heels of the massive
desegregation of public schools within its locale, and (b) that no blacks are or
have been in attendance as students and none is or has ever been employed as
a teacher or administrator at the private school.52
In addition, Brumfield v. Dodd5 3 provides support for the concept of shifting
the burden of proof as found in the revised procedure. In Brumfield, a United
States district court in Louisiana held seventy private schools in that state
racially discriminatory in spite of the state certification process, and thus in-
eligible for state textbook assistance.5 4 The Brumfield court relied extensively on
the Norwood decision and applied the Norwood test.
While the proposed procedure parallels Norwood's focus on schools formed
at or about the time of racial desegregation, it also covers schools substantially
expanded at the time of the desegregation, an area not included in Norwood's
general statement of the requirements of a prima facie case. However,
although none of the specific private schools in both cases involved substantial
expansion, both the Norwood and Blumfield courts made clear a substantial ex-
pansion was equally suspect. 55
The second difference between the Norwood court and the proposed pro-
cedure is the court's requirement that there be a total absence of minority
students or faculty for the inference to attach. Thus, in the proposed pro-
cedure, the IRS has gone beyond the criteria with clear support in the relevant
judicial decisions.
The revised proposed procedure is in accord with the Norwood court in ap-
plying a flexible standard and objective indices of nondiscrimination in rebut-
ting a prima facie case of discrimination. For each of the seven private schools
in question, the court required varying amounts of refutation specifically cor-
responding with the force of the original prima facie case. The proposed pro-
cedure follows this by requiring that "[t]he level of actions that are adequate
49 Id. at 925.
50 455 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1972).
51 Id. at 822 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
52 382 F. Supp. at 924-25 (E.D. La. 1970).
53 425 F. Supp. 528 (E.D. La. 1976).
54 Id. at 536.
55 382 F. Supp. at 926, 931; 425 F. Supp. at 533.
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may vary from school to school and depend upon the circumstances of the
school.' '56
The concept of shifting the burden of proof is further substantiated by the
general rule that the burden is on taxpayers and tax-exempt organizations in
tax controversies, both in litigation and in the administrative process, i.e., tax-
payers must substantiate deductions which are questioned by the Service.57
Further, a claim of tax-exempt status is not to be granted unless material facts
supporting such status are proven by the entity claiming the status.58
Although in criminal tax cases the burden is on the government to prove
the criminal tax offense, in civil litigation the determination of the IRS is
presumed to be correct and the taxpayer must meet the burden of overcoming
that presumption.
Opponents have argued that the proposed revenue procedure has
established definite standards against which certain private schools are to be
scrutinized. These standards are unalterable although private schools which
lose their tax-exempt status when judged against those standards have the op-
portunity to litigate the Service's determination. Thus, although procedural
due process requirements are met by providing adequate appeal rights, pro-
cedures which establish an irrebuttable presumption against certain schools
may still not satisfy the requirements of the due process clause.
The irrebuttable presumption doctrine was upheld in Heiner v. Donnan59
where the Supreme Court overturned a federal estate tax statute, which made a
conclusive presumption that gifts made within two years prior to the donor's
death were made in contemplation of death, thus requiring payment of a
higher estate tax. The Court held this irrebuttable presumption was so ar-
bitrary it deprived a taxpayer of property without due process of law. The ir-
rebuttable presumption doctrine was also upheld in Stanley v. Illinois,60 where
the Illinois Supreme Court's statutory presumption that all unmarried fathers
were not qualified to raise their children was overturned. Finally, in Cleveland
Board of Education v. LaFleur ,61 the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a local
board of education's rule requiring pregnant teachers to take maternity leave
without pay before and after the birth of a child.
However, not all standards making irrebuttable presumptions are un-
constitutional. Applying the rational relationship test, Sokol v. Commissioner62
upheld section 83 of the Internal Revenue Code which sets forth a statutory ir-
rebuttable presumption. The court stated that economic standards in the form
of irrebuttable presumptions will be upheld where there is a rational relation-
ship between the criteria in the standards and a legitimate purpose for such
standards.63
This rational relationship test, however, should not be applied in cases in-
volving fundamental rights. Here, the test is whether the presumption
56 44 Fed. Reg. 9,451, 9,454 (1979) (proposed S 4.03).
57 Cohan v. Comm'r, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930).
58 Burnet v. Houston, 283 U.S. 223 (1931).
59 285 U.S. 312 (1932).
60 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
61 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
62 574 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1978).
63 Id. at 698.
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established by a particular standard is universally true in fact and whether a
reasonable alternative exists by which to make the critical determination. 64
Since private schools are both secular and religious, the first amendment fun-
damental right of the free exercise of religion is involved. Thus, if an irrebut-
table presumption is involved in the proposed revenue procedures, then a two-
pronged test must be applied. For private secular schools the proper test is the
"rational relationship" test and for private religious schools it is the "univer-
sally true" test. In the proposed, revised, or prior revenue procedures, the In-
ternal Revenue Service has not made such a distinction.
Bob Jones University v. Simon65 further examined whether section 501 and
section 170 prohibited tax exemption to racially discriminatory private schools.
This case involved a private university which sued to enjoin the Service from
revoking its tax-exempt status for failure to submit information on its admis-
sions policy. Refusing to hear the merits of the case, the Supreme Court ruled
the suit was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act since it prohibits suits to restrain
the collection of taxes. 66 However, the Court referred to Coit v. Green,67 and
suggested that, as a matter of statutory construction, the IRS's interpretation
of section 501(c)(3) that a segregated private school does not qualify for tax ex-
emption had not been firmly established.
Two approaches addressing the ability of the IRS to promulgate
guidelines in the context of section 501 have emerged. One, employed by the
IRS and the district court in Green v. Connally, uses statutory construction to
conclude that section 501 and section 170 prohibited tax exemption to racially
discriminatory schools. The other, used by the McGlotten court, sets forth a con-
stitutional approach to examine the limitations on the grant of federal tax
benefits to private schools. The McGlotten court determined that the fifth
amendment affirmatively prohibited the grant of certain tax benefits to racially
discriminatory private charitable organizations.
Thus, the constitutional issue becomes whether the economic benefit
received by the organization so implicates the government in the private
discriminatory conduct that it becomes "state action" prohibited by the equal
protection or due process clause. Although the Supreme Court has not decided
whether a tax exemption is in itself sufficient government involvement to give
rise to state action, 68 some lower federal courts have held that racially restric-
tive private clubs could not receive tax exemptions under state law which were
the equivalent of a cash subsidy. 69 Other federal courts have held that mere
governmental approval of a tax exemption and the resulting imposition of
regulations amounts to only limited participation in a private entity's activities
and thus involves no state action.7 0
In 1976, the Congress endorsed the Green decision by adding Internal
Revenue Code section 501(i). This section denied exempt status to social clubs
64 Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
65 416 U.S. 725 (1974).
66 Id. at 749.
67 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'dper curiam sub nor. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
68 Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664(1970).
69 Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975).
70 Junior Chamber of Commerce v. United States Jaycees, 495 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1974).
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which "discriminat[e] against any person on the basis of race, color, or
religion. "71 In doing so, it overruled that portion of McGlotten which held social
clubs to be tax-exempt notwithstanding racially discriminatory membership
policies. The section upheld, however, that part of the decision which treated
fraternal societies as tax-exempt only if they did not discriminate racially. The
Senate report explaining the legislation went on to clarify the congressional
understanding that Green v. Connaly remains the law for educational institu-
tions tax-exempt under section 501(c)(3) and for the contributions of donors
under section 170(c)(2). 72 In this way, Congress brought social clubs within the
rule proscribing exempt status for private organizations, including private
schools, which discriminate on the basis of race.
In Runyon v. McCra, 73 the Supreme Court held that two privately owned
and operated schools, which received no public financial support, violated sec-
tion 1 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act 74 when they refused to accept black students
for admission. The Civil Rights Act of 1866, enacted in accordance with the
authority of Congress to legislate under the thirteenth amendment, has been
held to bar both public and private interference with contractual rights. By ap-
plying the Civil Rights Act to private schools and finding that parental rights to
neither privacy nor free association supersede the bar against segregation in
public contracts, Runyon enunciated the strong public policy against racial
discrimination and reinforced the Green decision.
In 1975 the Internal Revenue Service published Revenue Ruling 75-23175
which stated that private schools operated by churches, like other private
schools, may not be tax-exempt if they are racially discriminatory. Goldsboro
Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States76 upholds this position. Holding that a
private school is not entitled to tax exemption notwithstanding the religious
belief on which it bases its racially discriminatory admissions policy, the court
stated that there was a legitimate secular purpose for denying tax-exempt
status to schools maintaining a racially discriminatory admissions policy. 77 The
court viewed the general denial of tax benefits to such schools as neutral since
the primary effect could not be viewed as enhancing or inhibiting religion.
78
In contrast to the Goldsboro case, Bob Jones University v. United States79 held
that the revocation by the IRS of the tax-exempt status of a university practic-
ing racial discrimination was improper. The court ruled that the benefit con-
ferred on the University through tax exemption and deductions for contribu-
tions was not sufficient to run against the public policy opposed to racial
discrimination. 80 The court based its conclusions on its belief that the tax
benefits did not encourage the University to discriminate against minorities.
71 26 U.S.C. S 501(i) (1976).
72 S. REP. No. 94-1318, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 6051, 6058 n.5.
73 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
74 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976). Section 1 provides "all persons... shall have the same right.., to make
and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens: . .
75 Rev. Rul. 75-231, 1975-1 C.B. 158.
76 436 F. Supp. 1314 (E.D.N.C. 1977).
77 Id. at 1319-20.
78 Id. at 1320.
79 468 F. Supp. 890 (D.S.C. 1978).
80 Id. at 903-04.
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Commentators have been critical of this decision, since, in their opinion, it
misconstrues the rationale of the Green court. In their view, Green did not hold
that the public policy against racial discrimination barred the continuance of
only those government actions which encourage discrimination, but rather that
any form of government aid, even indirect aid to discriminatory educational in-
stitutions, was unacceptable because it would involve governmental financial
support for illegal activities.
III. The Proposed IRS Revenue Procedure and the
First Amendment Religion Clauses
All branches of the government are constrained by the first amendment's
free exercise and establishment clauses. In Walz v. Tax Commission,81 the
Supreme Court held that the existence of religious exercise must be permitted
without sponsorship or interference.
The Constitution does not speak directly to the question of the taxation of
churches or the regulation of their conduct by the granting of a tax-exempt
status; neither has the Supreme Court specifically ruled whether taxing
churches would violate the Constitution. However, the Court has considered
related questions in the balancing of the first amendment establishment and
free exercise clauses, while being conscious of excessive government entangle-
ment with religion.
In Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist8 2 and Lemon v. Kurtzman,83 the
Supreme Court summarized the elements necessary to determine whether
legislation was in conflict with the establishment clause. First, the law must
have a secular purpose. Second, it must not have the principal or primary ef-
fect of advancing or inhibiting religion. Third, it must not foster excessive
government entanglement with religion.8 4 The failure of any of these test
results in the program being contrary to the establishment clause.
In the analysis of the proposed guidelines under the three-pronged test, a
court must first find a legitimate secular purpose. Such a requirement reflects
the federal public policy against racial discrimination in education or the
courts' general sustenance, without inquiry as to motive, of tax legislation with
a revenue-raising purpose.
Second, to be constitutional, the denial of tax benefits to schools which
practice racial discrimination must be essentially a neutral act. 85 Because the
guidelines are not directed at religious schools alone, the results of their im-
plementation must be examined to determine if their primary effect would be
to inhibit the exercise of religion.
According to the proposed revised revenue procedure at section
3.03(c)(6), the IRS, in its determination of a "reviewable school," is to con-
sider the fact that:
81 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
82 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
83 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
84 413 U.S. at 773; 403 U.S. at 612-13.
85 Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
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The school was formed or expanded in accordance with a long-standing prac-
tice of a religion or religious denomination which itself is not racially
discriminatory to provide schools for religious education when circumstances
are present making it practical to do so (such as a sufficient number of persons
of that religious belief in the community to support the school), and such cir-
cumstances are not attributable to a purpose of excluding minorities. 86
This consideration could be construed to violate the principal of govern-
ment neutrality in several ways. According to this guideline, Catholic schools,
because of their long history of religious education, could expand or form
schools where the schools of other faiths would have a higher likelihood of being
adjudicated racially discriminatory. If this is true, the IRS has the authority to
define a "long-standing practice of religion ' 87 and can give preference to
denominations which had schools in the past over those which seek to establish
them in the future. Stretched to its logical limits, such a consideration oversteps
the boundary of government established in United States v. Ballard, 88 where the
Supreme Court held that men cannot be required to prove their religious doc-
trines or beliefs. The Court in Ballard reasoned that "[t]he First Amendment
does not select any one group or any one type of religion for preferred treat-
ment. "89 Later, in Fowler v. Rhode Island,90 the Supreme Court held that it was
not the business of the courts to determine that what constituted a religious
practice or activity for one group was not a first amendment protected religion
for another. 91
In contrast, it should be noted that the Supreme Court has adopted a prac-
tical approach to tax cases without invalidating legislation under the primary
effect test because of remote and incidental consequences. For example, the
taxation of newspapers may threaten freedom of the press. State taxation of the
privilege of doing business in interstate commerce may threaten its operation.
Because the guidelines are not directed at religious schools alone, it would,
therefore, be difficult to assert that the primary effect of the guidelines would be
to inhibit religion. 92
Just as an incidental neutrality would be impractical, even an absolute
separation would be impossible. 93 As a result, the course of the Supreme Court
has been that of a "benevolent neutrality.' "94 Where the choice must be made
between imposing a burden or extending the benefits, the Court has tended to
choose to extend the benefits since "[t]he importance of avoiding persistent
and potentially frictional contact between governmental and religious
86 44 Fed. Reg. 9,451, 9,453 (1979) (proposed 5 3.03(c)(6)).
87 Id.
88 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
89 Id. at 86-87.
90 345 U.S. 67 (1953).
91 Id. at 69-70.
92 Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S.
233 (1936).
93 Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971).
94 Exemption of religious institutions has been characterized as representative of a "benevolent
neutrality toward churches and religious exercise generally" that is "deeply imbedded in the fabric of our
national life." Walz v. Tax Comm'n. 397 U.S. at 676-77.
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authorities is such that it has been held to justify the extension, rather than the
withholding of certain benefits to religious organizations." 95
The third test is whether the proposed regulation fosters excessive govern-
ment entanglement with religion. Although no explicit ruling has been made,
dicta in Walz v. Tax Commission, which sustained tax exemption for religious
property, has implied that taxation of churches or religious organizations might
be unconstitutional. 96 In Walz, the Supreme Court noted that the test is actual-
ly one of degree. Either taxation or exemption of churches involves some
degree of involvement with religion. 97 The Court held that some government
involvement was inevitable with a tax exemption, but that this caused less en-
tanglement than taxation would. The Court was particularly concerned with
avoiding substantive governmental evaluation of religious practices 98 and the
entanglement of government and difficult classifications of what is and is .not
religious. 99
In its consideration, the Supreme Court was concerned with the possibili-
ty of both political and administrative entanglement. Political entanglement
has been defined as a program which threatens to divide political sentiment
along religious lines. Although no decisions have disqualified a program on this
ground alone, the Court has raised this as a possible ground of invalidation. 100
The resulting relationship between the government and the religious
organization was the factor used by the Walz Court in determining whether ad-
ministrative entanglement would be excessive. Danger of excessive entangle-
ment exists if continual government surveillance becomes necessary to police
the program, if the government must become involved in church decisions, or
if annual audits are required. 10 1 Although the surveillance necessary to enforce
the proposed revised revenue procedure would not require continual
surveillance or government involvement in decisions, annual audits might
become necessary. However, in the light of Roemer v. Maryland Public Works
Board, 102 it is unclear whether annual audits would be sufficient to invalidate
the guidelines. In Roemer, the Supreme Court approved occasional audits of
nonpublic colleges to determine their use of state aid where the audits were
quick and nonjudgmental and similar to those used for state accreditation. 10 3
According to Walz, the establishment clause should protect religious
organizations from government sponsorship, financial support, and active in-
volvement in religious activity. The proposed procedure does give use to con-
cern about excessive involvement in religious schoor matters. In fact, its con-
struction may allow greater governmental involvement if a school would claim
a tax exemption than if it would be taxable. For example, if a school was tax-
able, none of the numerical or record-keeping requirements would have to be
met. 104
95 426 U.S. at 748 n.15.
96 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970).
97 Id. at 674.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 698 (Harlan, J., concurring).
100 Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 797-98.
101 Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
102 Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
103 Id. at 764.
104 Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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In Green v. Connally, 1 0 5 the court specifically addressed whether the rights
of private schools under the first amendment would restrain it from ordering
the IRS to revoke a school's tax-exempt status if it did not satisfy the standards
for disproving a discriminatory policy. Rejecting a freedom of association
claim, the court stated that a right to be free from government regimentation,
such as the right to attend private schools, did not imply a right to financial
support. The Green court noted that "exemptions and deductions would be
denied not on account of beliefs and associations but on account of acts and
practices constituting discrimination among students on account of race-acts
contrary to a national policy that has constitutional ingredients." 10 6
Therefore, even statutory classifications which affect a fundamental right
are valid when they are "shown to be necessary to promote a compelling
governmental interest.'' 107 Thus, the compelling and reasonable interest to
combat racial discrimination stands on the highest constitutional ground.
"That government interest is dominant over other constitutional interests to
the extent that there is complete and unavoidable conflict." °10 8
Therefore, the Green court argues that if a compelling interest exists which
is strong enough to overcome one fundamental first amendment right, it should
also be sufficient to overcome a distinct but similar right. The Green court,
however, considered freedom of association, not freedom of religion. Religion
involves an additional constitutional proscription against the establishment of
religion.
The additional freedom of religion aspect was addressed in Goldsboro Chris-
tian Schools, Inc. v. United States. 10 9 In Goldsboro, the court held that a private
school which discriminated racially on the basis of religious conviction was in-
eligible for tax exemption. The court opined that to hold otherwise would
violate the establishment clause because it would condition an exception to the
usual rule of no exemption upon whether the finding that the school's beliefs
were sincerely held.110 This result would violate the rule in Reynolds v. United
States"' where the Court decided that both a freedom to believe and a freedom
to act existed within the religious clauses of the first amendment. The former
was held to be absolute while the latter was not.
Therefore, the Goldsboro court held that there was a legitimate secular pur-
pose for denying exemptions to discriminatory schools. This purpose justified
the disparity of allowing some (nondiscriminatory) religious schools to be tax-
exempt, while causing other (discriminatory) schools to be required to pay
taxes.
Bob Jones University v. United States'1 2 contradicts Goldsboro. In Bob Jones, the
court held that the University's policy of not admitting racially mixed couples
and of expelling any mixed couples that became couples after their admission
105 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'dper curiam sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
106 Id. at 1166.
107 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
108 330 F. Supp. at 1167. Where there is a compelling government interest even first amendment
freedom may be limited by appropriately confined lesser measures, although they could not be prohibited
directly. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
109 436 F. Supp. 1314 (E.D.N.C. 1977).
110 Id. at 1320.
111 98 U.S. 145 (1978); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
112 463 F. Supp. 890 (D.S.C. 1978).
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did not make it ineligible for exemptions. The court ignored the distinction in
Reynolds between religious beliefs and actions and held that the University was
practicing its religious beliefs when it penalized racially mixed couples. The
court concluded that there was no compelling government interest involved to
overcome the University's first amendment rights. The court based its holding
on the ground that discrimination against marriage between the races did not
involve the same public policy considerations as those presented by direct racial
discrimination. The proponents of the proposed revenue procedure argue that
this basis distinguishes the case from the Goldsboro decision.
As a result of the two conflicting district court decisions, and in the
absence of a definitive ruling by the Supreme Court, the law in this area is
unclear.
In addition to the establishment clause, the first amendment provides pro-
tection for religious schools through the free exercise clause. To sustain a free
exercise argument, it is necessary to show that an enactment has a coercive ef-
fect against a person in the practice of his religion. 113 When confronted with the
claim that government action infringes an individual's religious liberty, a court
must balance the competing interests of government regulation and religious
liberty. The government may regulate the conduct only if its interest is com-
pelling, nondiscriminatory, narrowly related to the public interest, and the
least restraint that would serve the purpose.' 14
Private religious education has been found to be a religious activity pro-
tected by the first amendment."15 As a result of the religious influence, even in
the teaching of secular subjects, the Supreme Court has found it could not ap-
prove funding even of secular instruction in private religious schools. If the
education in the private schools is so religious as to violate the establishment
clause when public funds are granted to the schools, then the religious nature of
the schools would appear to be entitled to the protection guaranteed to religion
by the free exercise clause.
If education is a religious liberty interest, and the proposed guidelines
have a direct or indirect effect upon the religious interest, then the balancing
test in Sherbert v. Verner"1 6 must be applied. The state regulation must be
justified by a "compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the
state's constitutional power to regulate.""II The strict restriction on intrusions
in this area is enforced in Thomas v. Collins"8 where the Supreme Court noted
that "only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion
for permissible limitation. ""19 Finally, the Supreme Court in Wisconsin v.
Yoder120 set forth "that only those interests of the highest order and those not
otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of
religion.' 2' Extended to their logical impact, the proposed procedures enter
113 Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
114 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
115 Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1970).
116 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
117 Id. at 403.
118 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
119 Id. at 530.
120 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
121 Id. at 215.
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this delicate area by questioning a religious school's ability to admit or deny
admittance to any student applying to the school as well as the school's ability
to hire and fire teachers based on a particular religious belief. Because the
Supreme Court has admittedly never addressed this question, 122 the en-
forceability of this aspect of the proposed guidelines should be carefully ana-
lyzed.
Government involvement in church affairs may rise to the level of en-
tanglement where free exercise would be threatened. Taxation alone, however,
is not sufficient to raise the entanglement question. Religious organizations
have lost their tax-exempt status in the past for failure to comply with the
statutory requirements for exempt organizations. The Supreme Court, in Gib-
bons v. United States, 123 upheld a tax on income-producing church property not
occupied by a church building. In Parker v. Commissioner, 124 the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld the withdrawal of the tax-exempt status of a religious
organization which had engaged in blatant profit-making activities. The Tenth
Circuit, in Christian Echoes National Ministry v. United States, 125 subjected a
religious organization to federal income tax by revoking its tax-exempt status
because of excessive political activities.
Finally, the income of churches arising from any unrelated trade or
business is currently statutorily subject to federal income taxation at corporate
rates. 126 This tax holds considerable potential for government involvement and
surveillance of church activities since it is imposed if the trade or business is
regularly carried on and the conduct of the business is not substantially related
to the church's exempt functions. The Internal Revenue Service also has audit
powers and requires churches to report their unrelated business income to it
within the limits of statutory protection against undue interference by the
government. 127
The potential for government administrative entanglement is one of the
strongest constitutional arguments against the proposed guidelines. However,
cases which have upheld the revocation of tax exemption of religious organiza-
tions which did not comply with the statutory requirements, and the past policy
of the IRS toward charitable organizations which are racially discriminatory,
may weaken this entanglement argument.
IV. The Twenty Percent Standard of the Proposed IRS Procedure
and the Bakke Decision of the Supreme Court
The revised proposed revenue procedure may violate the Supreme
Court's decision in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke12 8 because the
guidelines may require schools to use race-conscious criteria in determining ad-
missions policies. In Bakke, the Supreme Court invalidated the minority quota
122 Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 167 (1976).
123 116 U.S. 404, 407 (1886).
124 365 F.2d 792 (8th Cir. 1966).
125 404 F.2d 1066 (10th Cir. 1968).
126 26 U.S.C. §§ 511-552 (1976).
127 Id. §§ 6033, 7065 (1976).
128 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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admissions program at the Davis Medical School on the basis of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments. A majority of the Court disallowed the imposition of
racial goals, or other forms of race-conscious relief, unless specific findings of
past discrimination by the courts, Congress, or competent administrative
tribunals existed.
The percentage goal mandated by the proposed guidelines would require
that a school enroll a prescribed percentage of minority students or be found to
be presumptively discriminatory. Further, according to the guidelines, a school
will seldom qualify for a tax exemption unless it enrolls some minority
students, no matter how substantial the rebuttal evidence that it operates on a
nondiscriminatory basis. Thus, the validity of the numerical standards in the
guidelines may depend on whether they are supported by adequate judicial or
administrative findings of discrimination as required in Bakke.
According to the guidelines, apart from a final court adjudication, two fac-
tors can provide the basis for the revocation of a school's tax-exempt status.
The first factor is a statistical disparity in the racial composition of the school as
compared to the school-age population of the community. The second is the
formation or expansion of the schools at the time of public school desegregation
in the community. From Bakke, it is unclear whether the guidelines meet the
test of "findings of identified discrimination," or whether an individualized
agency determination on a school-by-school basis is required.
In support of the opposition to the guidelines, it can be argued that the
Supreme Court has begun a trend toward stricter standards regarding proof of
discriminatory intent and a reluctance to use traditional evidentiary presump-
tions like those employed in the proposed guidelines. In Swann v. Board of
Education, 129 the Supreme Court held that although the existence of one-race, or
virtually one-race, schools in a formerly dual school system continues to be
constitutionally suspect, the constitutional demand to desegregate schools does
not require that every school in every community always reflect the racial com-
position of the school system as a whole.130 The Supreme Court, in Washington
v. Davis,131 held that the racial impact of an act alleged to be racially
discriminatory does not per se constitute an equal protection violation where
there was no showing it was motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose. In
1977 the Court rejected a desegregation plan for the Dayton, Ohio, schools
which was based on the district court's finding that the schools in the district
were racially imbalanced. The Court held that the lack of homogeneity of the
pupil population of the Dayton schools was not of itself a violation of the four-
teenth amendment without a showing of intentional segregative actions on the
part of the school board. 32 Thus, a proven intentional constitutional or
statutory violation must be shown before preferential classification of one race
over another can be sustained.
In contrast, the coupling to the two standards may provide sufficient cir-
cumstantial evidence of discriminatory interest to meet the current constitu-
tional standards. In Village ofArlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
129 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
130 Id. at 24.
131 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
132 Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 413 (1977).
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Corp.,'13 the Supreme Court concluded that while racial impact is not the sole
turning point of an invidious discrimination, it may be probative when viewed
against the entire sequence of events in the challenged action. Thus, an in-
ference of discrimination may be sustained where the effect of enrollment deci-
sions by tax-exempt private schools, as reflected in their racial student com-
position, occurs in close proximity to and impedes the progress of public school
desegregation. In Green v. Connally
, 
134 where proximity in time was a factor, the
court stated it was within the authority of the IRS to impose a desegregation
order on schools with the same badge of doubt, whether the schools were
organized in contemplation of litigation about to start or after a decree had
been issued.
An additional consideration centers in the fact situation of the Bakke deci-
sion. Allen Bakke filed suit because he was denied admission to medical school
at the same time that minority students with lower academic records than he
had were admitted as a result of the special admissions program. In the pro-
posed revenue procedure, the twenty percent "safe harbor" does not deny ad-
mittance to qualified white students at private schools. Instead, the twenty per-
cent requirement only sets forth that a particular school will not be considered
discriminatory if the twenty percent standard is satisfied. It can be argued,
then, that the Bakke decision was concerned with the situ'ation where an in-
dividual was alleging he was being discriminated against because of a special
admissions program while the twenty percent standard of the proposed pro-
cedure was concerned with whether certain private schools with tax-exempt
status were discriminating against minorities.
Further, Bakke seemed to uphold the right of an agency to adopt race-
conscious programs to remove a disparate racial impact.
Properly construed, therefore, our prior cases unequivocally show that a
state government may adopt race-conscious programs if the purpose of such
programs is to remove the disparate racial impact its actions might otherwise
have and if there is reason to believe that the disparate impact is itself the
product of past discrimination, whether its own or that of society at large.'35
Finally, it has not been resolved whether the IRS has been authorized by
statute or constitutional mandate to make an administrative determination re-
quiring the race-conscious measures of the proposed guidelines. The Supreme
Court has not determined the state action implications of tax-exempt status or
whether section 501 provides a statutory basis of IRS surveillance of private
school admissions policies. As a result, the IRS can be distinguished from
federal civil rights agencies which have been given a statutory mandate to en-
force nondiscrimination requirements. If, however, tax benefits are a form of
"federal financial assistance" as implied in Green and McGlotten, then the IRS
would have the authority to issue the guidelines as a grantmaking agency
under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
133 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977).
134 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
135 438 U.S. at 369 (Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, White, JJ., dissenting).
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V. Congressionally Proposed Alternatives to the
Proposed IRS Revenue Procedure
The bills which have been introduced into the Ninety-Sixth Congress
regarding the proposed revenue procedure fall into four categories:
1. Resolutions expressing the sense of Congress.
2. Bills to Prohibit the Final Issuance of the Proposed Revenue Pro-
cedures.
3. Bills to Amend Section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
4. An Amendment to the Fiscal 1980 Treasury Department Appropria-
tions Act.
1. Concurrent resolutions expressing the sense of the Congress have been
introduced by Congressmen Guyer, 136 Satterfield 137 and Evans. 138
The resolutions of Congressmen Guyer and Satterfield advocate that the
proposed revenue procedure not be adopted since the purpose of tax legislation
and regulation is to raise revenue, not to coerce certain classes of individuals
toward government ends. According to the resolutions, to do so would violate
freedom of choice for private groups and individuals since no rational nexus ex-
ists between the IRS function to collect taxes and the procedures.
Congressman Evans would seek to express the sense of Congress that the
proposed procedures should not be adopted since they are a usurpation of con-
gressional authority. According to this resolution, Congress is the only con-
stitutionally mandated authority to deal in this area and it has already ex-
pressed itself by exempting from taxation certain organizations operating ex-
clusively for education purposes.
2. Bills to prohibit final issuance of the proposed revenue procedures have
been introduced by Congressmen McDonald, 3 9 Evans, 140 Quillen,' 4 1 St. Ger-
main, 42 Crane,143 Hammerschmidt4', and Dickinson. 145
The bills of Congressmen McDonald, Evans, Quillen and St. Germain
would prohibit the Secretary of the Treasury from issuing, in final or proposed
form, the proposed guidelines, or issuing any regulation, revenue procedure,
revenue ruling, or other guidelines setting forth rules similar to the proposed
guidelines. These bills have no expiration date.
If these bills are enacted, a conflict would occur when the suits which are
currently pending against the IRS are decided. Pursuant to the Green case,
these suits will most likely compel the IRS to take actions to enforce the non-
discrimination rule applicable to private schools. The bills would not affect
136 H.R. Con. Res. 11, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. H133 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 1979).
137 H.R. Con. Res. 39, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. H340 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1979).
138 H.R. Con. Res. 9, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. Rac. H133 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 1979).
139 H.R. 559, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. H171 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1979).
140 H.R. 1009, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. H186 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1979).
141 H.R. 1719, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. H403 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1979).
142 H.R. 1736, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. H403 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1979).
143 H.R. 214, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. R~c. H163 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1979).
144 H.R. 1670, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. Rac. H402 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1979).
145 H.R. 263, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. H164 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1979).
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Revenue Procedure 75-50 which established criteria by which a school is
granted or denied tax-exempt status.
The bills introduced by Congressmen Crane, Hammerschmidt, and
Dickinson, like the earlier discussed bills, would prohibit the Secretary of the
Treasury from issuing the proposed revenue procedure or similar measures in
final form. The distinction is that these bills would be for a limited period of
time, until December 31, 1980. The reason for the limited period of effec-
tiveness is to give Congress the time to consider the question whether it wishes
to review in depth the tax status of private schools.
The effect of these bills would be the same for those previously discussed
except that the likelihood of a judicial-congressional conflict would be reduced
since the proscription against IRS publication of the revenue procedure would
lapse prior to the final implementation of any judicial orders in the pending
suits against the IRS.
3. Bills to amend section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code have been in-
troduced by Congressmen Dornan 146 and Chappell. 147
House Resolution 1002,148 introduced by Congressman Dornan, would
amend section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code to legislatively provide
that an exemption from taxation and a deduction for contributions made to
organizations would not be construed as a provision of federal financial
assistance. The intent of the bill is to remove the granting of tax exemptions
and deductions from consideration as an offense to federal public policy.
This bill would conflict with section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
which sets forth a federal public policy against support for racial segregation in
private or public schools. Section 601 provides that "[n]o person in the United
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 49
Again, this bill conflicts with Green v. Connally which held that tax exemp-
tions and deductions to educational institutions were forms of federal benefits
or indirect aid.15 0 The court stated that such aid is barred by section 601 of the
Civil Rights Act and implied that it may also offend the Constitution.
If the granting of such aid is unconstitutional, merely amending the Inter-
nal Revenue Code would not be sufficient to relinquish the requirement of the
revocation of tax exemption and deductions to discriminatory schools. If, in the
suits pending against the IRS, the courts hold, on a constitutional basis, that
exemptions and deductions for contributions constitute impermissible federal
financial aid to discriminatory schools, the IRS may still be compelled to deny
such exemptions and deductions. If the courts consider the issue to be a ques-
tion of fact rather than law, the legislation would be outside the legislative
authority of Congress. House Resolution 1002 would apply the amendment
retroactively to all organizations under section 501(c), not just educational in-
stitutions.
146 H.R. 1002, 96th Cong., ist Sess., 125 CONG. REC. H186 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1979).
147 H.R. 96, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CoNG. REc. H160 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1979).
148 H.R. 1002, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. H186 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1979).
149 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
150 330 F. Supp. at 1169.
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Finally, House Resolution 96,151 as introduced by Congressman Chap-
pell, would amend section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code to prohibit
the IRS from terminating the exempt status of any institution organized for
educational purposes solely because such school has a racially discriminatory
policy unless the school has been adjudicated racially discriminatory in a
federal or state court. Following the passage of this bill, the IRS could no
longer terminate a school's tax-exempt status on the grounds of racial
discrimination until a party with standing raised and litigated successfully
whether a school was racially discriminatory. By means of this procedure, the
burden of proof would shift from the educational institution to the plaintiff in
an adversary proceeding which involved a justiciable controversy.
Parties with standing in a suit charging racial discrimination would in-
clude a student denied admission, the parents of such a student, and taxpayers
in the community where the school is located. Since the statute requires the
IRS to grant exemption to discriminatory schools if they otherwise qualify, the
IRS would not be a party-in-interest for standing purposes.
In Green v. Connally the district court held that the Internal Revenue Code
required the "denial of tax exempt status and deductibility of contributions to
private schools practicing racial discrimination. ' 152 If this ruling involved a
constitutional issue, the proposed amendment to the Internal Revenue Code
would not be allowed. If, however, it was not a constitutionally based issue,
then the proposed amendment to the Code can stand. The Green court implied
constitutional underpinnings were involved in its decision, but did not explicit-
ly state that this was so.
In effect, then, the bill would require the IRS to continue the tax-exempt
status of a school until an adjudication would be reached in a subsequent or
nonadministrative forum. However, the bill would not ban the IRS from deny-
ing an application for exemption to a racially discriminatory private s hool not
already exempt.
Certainly House Resolution 96 is the most popular of the many bil which
have been introduced. To date, it has been cosponsored by eighty-si,: con-
gressmen from thirty-three states. In support of his bill, Mr. Chappell has
asserted that it would focus on schools which have given a probable cause to
suspect discrimination rather than place a blanket accusation on all schools
founded or expanded during a particular period of time. Further, in a court-
room adjudication, an accurate description of the facts could be more easily at-
tained than in an agency proceeding. 53
4. An Amendment to the fiscal 1980 Treasury Department Appropria-
tions Act has been introduced by Congressman Ashbrook1 4 and adopted by
the House of Representatives.15 The amendment prohibits funds made
available pursuant to the Appropriations Act from being used to carry out a
151 H.R. 96, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. H160 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1979).
152 330 F. Supp. At 1176.
153 Proposed IRS Revenue Procedure Affecting Tax-Exemption of Private Schools: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1142 (1979) (statement of William
Chappell, Jr.).
154 H.R. 4393, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. Rac. H5748 (daily ed. July 11, 1979).
155 Treasury Department Appropriations Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-74, § 103, 93 Stat. 559, 562
(1979).
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regulation which would cause the loss of tax-exempt status to private, religious,
or church-related schools under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code
unless the regulation was in effect prior to August 22, 1978.156
Even though the House rules prohibit substantive legislation from being
added to an appropriations bill, such an amendment is permitted if it limits the
use of money for a particular purpose. The proponents of the Ashbrook
Amendment argued that such a limitation was necessary to restrict the IRS
from implementing the proposed regulation until Congress could act upon
it.157 They asserted that the amendment would provide the Subcommittee on
Oversight of the House Committee on Ways and Means with an additional
year to develop a permanent resolution to the problem.1 58 Opponents
countered that irrespective of the question involved, the addition of a substan-
tive issue to an appropriations bill subverted the historical procedure of waiting
for legislative direction from the appropriate committee. 159
Since the courts have not defined the legal effect of legislation attached to
appropriations bills, the congressional intent would undoubtedly play a major
role in determining the resolution of a potential court action.1 60 The floor
debate indicates that, absent congressional or judicial direction, the Service is
prohibited from establishing new methods of revoking the tax-exempt status of
private schools from August 22, 1978, until the 1980 Treasury Department Ap-
propriations Act expires. 161 Therefore, if a private school challenged the
removal of its tax-exempt status in court, the court would be required to deter-
mine, as a matter of law, whether the Service's action was based on regulations
in existence before or after August 22, 1978. If the Service's action was judged
to be based on regulations existing before the cut-off date, the school would be
forced to comply with its requirements. If a post-August 22, 1978, revenue rul-
ing was involved in the Service's action, it would be prohibited from revoking
the school's tax-exempt status.
VI. Conclusion
Since 1971, the Internal Revenue Service has been under an injunction to
insure that tax-exempt status is not accorded to racially discriminatory private
schools. 162
In response to that injunction, in 1978 and 1979 the Service issued pro-
posed revenue procedures seeking to establish guidelines to remove the tax-
exempt status of private schools which discriminate.1 63 These proposals have
become the most controversial endeavor the Service has ever undertaken.
156 Id.
157 125 CONG. REc. H5882 (daily ed. July 13, 1979) (remarks of Rep. Ashbrook).
158 125 CONG. REC. H5885 (daily ed. July 13, 1979) (remarks of Rep. Dickinson).
159 125 CONG. REC. H5881 (daily ed. July 13, 1979) (remarks of Rep. Ullman).
160 TVAv. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); U.S. v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554 (1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 724
(1940).
161 125 CONG. REC. H5879 (daily ed. July 13, 1979).
162 Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'dper curiam sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404
U.S. 997 (1971).
163 44 Fed. Reg. 9,451 (1979); 43 Fed. Reg. 37,296 (1978).
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The greatest difficulty has arisen from the Service's impatience with the
courts' adjudication of racially discriminatory schools. Instead of relying upon
judicial procedure it has proposed standards which would shift the burden of
proof to the schools to prove administratively whether or not they were racially
discriminatory.
The time since court-ordered desegregation of schools has seen not only
the establishment of white-flight schools as a result of integration, but also the
founding of private religious and other schools as an outgrowth of an increasing
discontent with the public educational system. Thus, any guidelines based on a
time period alone involve both types of schools.
Regulation of private religious schools bring to the forefront difficult first
amendment problems. While Green v. Connally held that the fundamental right
to attend a private school did not imply a right to financial support, it did not
rule whether tax exemption was a method of support. While Goldsboro stated
that there is a legitimate secular purpose for denying tax exemption, Bob Jones
held that first amendment rights are stronger than the government's compell-
ing interest to penalize discrimination. As a result, the judicial basis for the
removal of tax-exempt status from religious schools has not been firmly
established. Likewise, a clear directive has not been given whether tax exemp-
tion is federal support and whether nondiscrimination is a strong enough
government interest to supercede first amendment rights in this area.
The issue remains whether the Internal Revenue Service should be a
policy enforcement body. Most would agree it is the only agency of the govern-
ment with sufficient influence to remove the last fortress of discrimination in
the American educational system. However, policy arguments can also be
made that tax-exempt status was established to remove religion from any type
of government control. Certainly both goals are crucial and must be carefully
weighed in a constitutional setting to maintain a proper governmental neutrali-
ty.
The area of greatest concern is the injury which the Service could do to
private religious education if the discretion it has proposed for itself would be
used out of hand. While the argument can be made that the courts are
available for redress, this is costly and time consuming and in many instances
would mean the elimination of the school involved.
Therefore, Congressman Chappel's well-received House Resolution 96
seems to provide the best long-range solution at this time. This bill would
amend the Internal Revenue Code to allow termination of the tax-exempt
status of a private school by the IRS only where the school had been adjudged
racially discriminatory. Thus, the determination of discrimination would be
adjudicated in the courts and the implementation would occur under an ad-
ministrative agency. Since a constitutional basis was not explicitly stated by the
Green court for the revocation of tax exemption, a Congressional enactment
would take precedence over its decision.
Certainly the concept behind the proposed guidelines is mandated by
judicial action. However, if its application approaches government entangle-
ment in first amendment protected areas, then discretion should be denied in
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those areas without the proper balancing of fundamental rights within the pro-
cedural confines of a court of law.
A regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the
constitutional requirement for government neutrality if it unduly burdens the
free exercise of religion. 164
164 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1971).
